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1. INTRODUCTION
In many applied economic problems, it is possible to observe data only for a
subset of individuals from the overall population. When observations are selected
in a process that is not independent of the outcome of interest a problem of sample
selection may arise. Since Heckman (1979)’s seminal paper, the problem of sample
selection bias has been extensively studied in economics literature with empirical
applications. Sample selection has been commonly treated in cross-sectional studies
but it has not been often considered a concern in panel data. In fact when the se-
lection process is time constant, panel data estimator may eliminate most forms of
unobserved heterogeneity (Vella, 1998; Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina, 2000;
2007). However, the selection process in many economic applications is not time
constant. Wooldridge has proposed a panel estimator for sample selection models
which also accounts for heterogeneity across individuals. In this note we present a
new characterization of the Wooldridge’s two-steps estimation method: we apply
the model to the case in which selectivity is due to two sources rather than one.
Then, we apply the proposed model to a test for asymmetric information in the pri-
vate health insurance markets (see Chiappori and Salanie´, 2000a; 2000b) The data
for the empirical application is drawn from the 2003/2004 Agency for Healthcare
Research Quality’s Medical Expenditure Panel— Household Component (MEPS-
HC)1 in conjunctions with the 2002 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS)2.
We use a subsample of 496 individuals followed for two years resulting in 992 ob-
servations; the subsample includes single individuals of working age (from 18 to
65 years old), they get health insurance through individual markets or through
their employers or organizations (such as unions, professional associations, or other
groups). For the employers-sponsored private coverage we include in the sample
individuals who have the possibility to choose between several plans3. The key idea
of the application is to test whether the individuals who are more exposed to health
risks also buy insurance contracts with more coverage or higher expected payments.
The critical statistical problem is that the extension of insurance is only measured
for those who are insured and face positive health care expenditure. So there is a
possible sample selection bias eﬀect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 extendsWooldridge(1995)’s
model to the case in which selectivity is due to two sources. Subsections 2.1 and
2.2 present the empirical illustration of the model in detail. Section 3 concludes
the paper with a discussion. The definition of the variables, descriptive statistics
and tables with estimation coeﬃcients are in Appendix .
1MEPS is an annual survey whose main purpose is to examine insurance trends and healthcare
utilization among the non-institutionalized population in the United States.
2National Centers for Health Statistics (NCHS), (Center for Disease Control and Prevention)-
NHIS provides rather detailed information about health status, diseases, life-style, education and
other individual characteristics.
3In U.S. it is quite common that employers provide health insurance as part of the benefits
package for employees. In many employer-sponsored private coverage, employers allow employees
to choose between several plans, including both indemnity insurance and managed care. Other
employers oﬀer only one plan. Only if employers allow insurers flexibility in designing health
insurance plans a problem of asymmetric information may occur.
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2. WOOLDRIDGE ESTIMATION WITH TWO SELECTION CRITERIA
We start by sketching Wooldridge’s (1995) sample selection model with one
selection criterion, then we present a specification of the model in which the selection
process is based on two selection criteria rather than one. According to Rochina-
Barrachina (1999) we consider the following problem:
d∗it = zitγ + µi + uit
dit = 0 if d
∗
it ≤ 0
dit = 1 if d
∗
it > 0
(1)
y∗it = xitβ + αi + εit
yit = y
∗
it if dit = 1
yit not observed otherwise
(2)
where equation (1) defines the selection rule while equation (2) is the primary equa-
tion. i (i = 1, ...n) denotes the individuals while t (t = 1, ..., t) denotes the panel.
xit and zit are vector of exogenous variables with possibly common elements and
definitely with an exclusion restriction. γ and β are unknown parameter vectors
to be estimated. Terms µi and αi are unobservable time invariant fixed eﬀects
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which are possibly correlated with each other. uit and εit are unobserved distur-
bances, possibly correlated with each other. The dependent variable in the primary
equation(1), yit, is observed only for the observations satisfying the selection rule
i.e. only if the indicator variable dit = 1.
Similar to Chamberlain (1980), Wooldridge (1995) assumes the fixed eﬀects in
the equation (2) have the following relationship:
µi = zi1δ1 + ...+ zitδt + ci (3)
where ci is a random component. By substituting Chamberlain characterization
into the selection equation yields:
d∗it = zitγ + zi1δ1 + ...+ zitδt + vit (4)
where vit = ci + uit. vit is distributed independently of zit and it is normally
distributed with zero mean and σ2 variance. The regression function of αi on zit
and vit is linear, accordingly:
E [αi |zit, vit ] = xi1ψ1 + ...+ xitψt + φtvit (5)
We do not observe vit, but only the binary indicator dit. Then, we replace E [αi |zit, vit ]
with:
E [αi |zit, dit = 1] = xi1ψ1 + ...+ xitψt + φtE [vit |zit, dit = 1] (6)
Wooldridge assumes that εit is mean independent of zit conditional on vit and its
conditional mean is linear on vit:
E [εit |zit, vit ] = E [εit |vit ] = ρtvit (7)
4The individual eﬀects are assumed to be the fixed eﬀets rather than the random eﬀects.
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By the Law of Iterated Expectation:
E [εit |zit, dit = 1] = ρtE [vit |zit, dit = 1] (8)
From the above assumption, Wooldridge derives an explicit expression for
E [αi + εit |zit, dit = 1] = E [αi |zit, dit = 1] +E [εit |zit, dit = 1] =
= xi1ψ1 + ...+ xitψt + (φt + ρt)E [vit |zit, dit = 1] (9)
where
E [vit |zit, dit = 1] = λ (zi1γ1 + ...+ zitγt) (10)
So, for each period, Wooldridge suggests to estimate a cross-sectional probit model
for participation and compute the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR), then, estimate the
structural equation:
yit = xi1ψ1 + ...+ xitψt + xitβ + (φt + ρt)λ (zi1γ1 + ...+ zitγt) (11)
by using fixed eﬀect OLS or pooled OLS for the sample for which dit = 1 (Vella,
1998).
In the following we will propose a new specification of Wooldridge two step es-
timation method extended to the case in which selectivity is based on two indices.
We apply the method to a test for asymmetric information. The test is based on the
hypothesis that there exists a positive correlation between the high risk profile in-
dividuals and the extension of health insurance plan (see Cardon and Hendel, 2001;
Cutler, Zeckhouser, 2000). In order to test for diﬀerences in insurance purchases by
high and low risk profile individuals we use as indicator of completeness of coverage
the natural logarithm of health insurance reimbursement (i.e. of healthcare expen-
diture paid by private insurance) as a share of total health expenditures (Keeler
et al., 1977, Browne and Doerpinghaus, 1993). Health insurance reimbursement is
only defined for those who participate in insurance and face positive health care
expenditure. So, we consider the following characterization of Wooldridge’s sample
selection model where selectivity bias is a function of two indices:
d∗it1 = zit1γ1 + µi1 + uit1
dit1 = 0 if d
∗
it1 ≤ 0
dit1 = 1 if d
∗
it1 > 0
(12)
d∗it2 = zit2γ2 + µi2 + uit2
dit2 = 0 if d
∗
it2 ≤ 0
dit2 = 1 if d
∗
it2 > 0
(13)
y∗it = xitβ + αi + εit
yit = y
∗
it if dit1 = 1 & dit2 = 1
yit not observed otherwise
(14)
where dit1 is an unobserved variable denoting insurance participation decision and
dit2 an unobserved variable denoting health care expenditure participation decision.
zit1 , zit2 and xit are vector of exogenous variables with possibly common elements
and definitely with an exclusion restriction. yit denotes the natural logarithm of
health insurance reimbursement as share of total healthcare expenditure. yit is
observed only for the sample for which dit1 = 1 and dit2 = 1. Terms µi1 , µi2 and αi
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are fixed eﬀects. uit1 , uit2 and εit are unobserved disturbances, possibly correlated
with each others.
The method of estimation relies crucially on the relationship between vit1 and
vit2
5, in particular, the estimation depends on whether the two error terms are
independent or correlated, that is whether or not Cov (vit1 , vit2) = 0. The simplest
case is when the disturbances are uncorrelated (Maddala, 1983; Vella, 1998). If
Cov (vit1 , vit2) = 0 we can easily extend Wooldridge’s two-step estimation method
to our model. The correction term to include as regressor in the primary equation
is:
E [εit |zit, dit1 = 1, dit2 = 1] = ρt1λ1
¡
zi11γ11 + ...+ zit1γt1
¢
+
+ρt2λ2
¡
zi12γ12 + ...+ zit2γt2
¢ (15)
Then, we estimate the following model:
yit = xi1ψ1 + ...+ xitψt + xitβ +
¡
φt1 + ρt1
¢
λ1
¡
zi11γ11 + ...+ zit1γt1
¢
+
+
¡
φt2 + ρt2
¢
λ2
¡
zi12γ12 + ...+ zit2γt2
¢ (16)
The procedure consists in first estimating, for each period, by two single a cross-
sectional probit model, the selection equation one and the selection equation two.
Than, the two corresponding Inverse Mills Ratio can be imputed and included as
correction terms in the primary equation. Thus, by pooled OLS, estimate of the
resulting primary equation corrected for selection bias can be done for the sample
for which dit1 = 1 and dit2 = 1.
In the case vit1 and vit2 are correlated, so that Cov (vit1 , vit2) = σ
2 we have to
use for each period cross-sectional bivariate probit methods to estimate γit1 and
γit2 . Further,
E
£
εit
¯¯
zit1 , zit2dit1 = 1, dit2 = 1
¤
= ρt1M12 + ρt2M21 (17)
whereMij = (1− σ12)−1 (Pi − σ12Pj) and Pj =
Z zit1γt1
−∞
Z zit2γt2
−∞
vit1vit2 f(vit1 ,vit2)dvit1dvit2
F(zit1γt1 ,zit2γt2)
.
2.1. Bivariate Probit Model for Care Expenditure and Insurance
In order to test whether vit
1
and vit
2
are correlated we run for each year a
“preliminary” bivariate probit between insurance and health care expenditure par-
ticipation. In our model the dependent variable employed to predict the probability
of facing positive health care expenditure is a binary variable that takes value one
if individuals incur in positive health care expenditure during the year of interview,
and zero otherwise. The independent variables employed can been categorized into
three dimensions: need for care (need to see a specialist, need to have treatments
or tests), predisposition to use health services (age, sex, race) and enabling factors
(education, insurance, income, employment status, region and residential location).
Among enabling factor, we consider insurance participation. An insured individ-
ual, in fact, may consume more medical services and have a greater expenditure
compared to an uninsured one (Arrow, 1985; Pauly, 1974). In this application, the
5From Chamberlain trasformation of the individual eﬀects: vit1 = ci1 + uit1 and vit2 =
ci2 + uit2
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situation is further complicated by the fact that insurance participation itself may
be aﬀected by the likelihood of having positive health expenditure. The choice of
insurance coverage may be aﬀected by planned medical expenditure and expecta-
tions about medical care utilization. Thus, in order to test the potential endogeneity
of health insurance and at the same time whether the covariance between health
insurance choice and health expenditure participation is significantly diﬀerent of
zero, we run for each year a cross sectional recursive bivariate probit models (Cap-
pellari and Jenkins,2003). For each period, the recursive structure builds on a first
reduced form equation for the potentially endogenous dummy measuring insurance
participation and a second structural form equation determining the expenditure
participation:
d∗it1
= zi11γ11 + ...+ zit1γt1 + vit1 (18)
d∗it2 = zi12γ12 + ...+ zit2γt2 + vit2 =
= zi12γ12 + ...+ dit1 ζ + witξ + vit2
(19)
where d∗it1 and d
∗
it2 are latent variables, and dit1 and dit2 are dichotomous variables
observed according to the rule:½
ditj = 0 if d
∗
itj ≤ 0
ditj = 1 if d
∗
itj > 0
; j = 1, 2 (20)
zitj and wit are vectors of exogenous variable with possibly common elements, γ
and ξ are parameter vectors, ζ is a scalar parameter. The dependent variable
dit1 used to predict the probability of being insured is again a dummy variable
that takes value one if respondents are insured and zero otherwise. The vector of
explanatory variables zit
1
used to predict the probability of being insured includes
both exogenous variables that are determinants of health expenditure and personal
attributes that are only determinative of health insurance choice6 ( i.e. employment
status, union status, insurance attitude).
We assume that, for each period, the error terms vit1 and vit2 are distributed as
bivariate normal, with zero mean and variance covariance matrix Σ. Σ has values
of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations ρ12 = ρ21 as oﬀ-diagonal elements:µ
vit1
vit2
¶
∼ IIDN
µ·
0
0
¸
,
·
1 ρ12
ρ21 1
¸¶
(21)
In the above setting, the exogeneity condition is stated in terms of the correlation
coeﬃcient, which can be interpreted as the correlation between the unobservable
explanatory variables of the two diﬀerent equations. The two selection equations
can be estimated separately as single probit models only in the case of independent
error terms vit1 and vit2 i.e. the coeﬃcient ρjk is not significantly diﬀerent of zero
(k = 1, 2). If the error terms vit1 and vit2 are independent we can deal with the
above model as independent equations (Maddala, 1983) and apply the model in the
equation (16).
Table 3 shows the correlation coeﬃcients and the p-value for each year sample:
6Estimation of a recursive bivariate probit model requires some considerations for the identifi-
cation of the model parameters: at least one of the insurance equation exogenous variables has not
to be included in the expenditure equation as explanatory variable (Maddala, 1983). Following
Maddala’s approach we include among explanatory variables in the insurance equation a measure
of attitude toward health insurance participation and the indicator of employment status and
union status.
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the null hypothesis of Cov
¡
vit1 , vit2
¢
= 0 is not rejected; hence, we can deal with
the model in the equation (16) and compute Inverse Mills Ratio by using the two
selection equations as single probit models. Tables 4 and 5 show coeﬃcients for
insurance choice and expenditure participation equation estimated using bivariate
probit specification.
2.2. Empirical Illustration of Structural Equation
In order to perform the correlation test, first we classify individuals as being
high and low risk profile individuals. Individuals are classified as being high-risk
if their health status is not good. As a measure of health status we use SAH
(self-assessed health)7, which is a five category variable rating from poor to excel-
lent. We construct a binary variable (high risk) with the value one if individuals
report that their health status is fair or poor and zero otherwise (excellent, very
good, good). Then, we classify as high-risk individuals those whose self-reported
health is fair or poor. In addition to the health indicator, the independent vari-
ables, used to control for diﬀerences in policy, can be grouped in the following
categories: demographic variables (age, sex), socioeconomic variables (education,
income8) individual’s preferences for health insurance, health insurance plan charac-
teristics (out-of-pocket annual premium, co-payment, whether insurance plan covers
prescription drug costs and dental bills, whether respondents get their insurance
through their employers or other organizations), observable risk (whether individ-
uals suﬀer from any form of disabilities that limit their activities9).Moreover, we
control for the healthcare expenditure paid by other sources diﬀerent of insurance
company. When executing the model described above, there is an important issue
that need to be considered. To improve the identification of the model, selected
variables need to meet the exclusion restriction criterion (see Maddala, 1983; Vella,
1993; 1998). Specifically, the explanatory variables included in the bivariate probit
model should contain at least one variable that aﬀects selection but does not have
eﬀect on the extent of insurance purchase. Without meeting the exclusion restric-
tion, the model is likely to suﬀer from a collinearity problem. MEPS contains a
self-administered questionnaire (SAQ) with questions that ascertain health-related
attitudes; respondents were asked if they agree strongly, or disagree with the fol-
lowing statements: ”Health insurance is not worth the money it costs” and ”I am
more likely to take risks than the average person”. The first statement is directly
related to an individual’s preferences for health insurance: respondent is asked to
directly assess the value of health insurance relative to his perception of its cost.
In contrast, the second statement provides indirect measures that are likely to be
associated with attitudes toward health insurance. While individual’s preferences
for health insurance may aﬀect the extent of insurance purchase, attitude toward
7SAH is supported by a large literature that shows the strong predictive relationship between
people’s self rating of their health and mortality or morbidity (Idler and Beyamini, 1997; Kennedy
et al. 1998). Moreover, self assessed health correlates strongly with more complex health indices
such as functional ability or indicators derived from health service use (Unden and Elofosson,
2006).
8We do not include in the structural equation employment and union status among socioe-
conomic variables to avoid multicollinearity problems since they are strictly correlated with the
variable that measure whether respondents have an employer or union-sponsored private coverage.
9The variable that we use as indicator of limited activity controls for the portion of risk
observable to the insurer. The activity limitations indicator is expected to be positively related
to the generosity of the health insurance plan, because being limited increases the likelihood of
need for medical care
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health insurance might influence decisions to purchase health insurance. Hence we
include the first indicator in the structural equation for insurance reimbursement,
and the second one in the insurance participation equation.
Table 6 shows the coeﬃcients for the structural insurance reimbursement equa-
tion estimated using pooled OLS specification. We find evidence for asymmetric
information: table 6 shows that the coeﬃcient estimate for the variable ”high risk”
is positively and significantly correlated with the health insurance reimbursement.
Other than regular variables, two independent variables here are the IMR (In-
verse Mills Ratio) which have been estimated from the first and second probit
selection equations. When added to the outcome equation as additional regres-
sors, they measure the sample selection eﬀect due to lack of observations on the
non-health insurance purchasers and non-health expenditure participants. These
variables should be statistically significant to justify the use of Wooldridge two-step
estimation. Since in our models they are statistically significant there may be sam-
ple selection problem in the data and we need to use the extension of Wooldridge
method.
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we discuss Wooldridge’s (1995) two step estimator that address the
problem of sample selection and correlated individual heterogeneity in selection and
outcome equation simultaneously. We show how it can be extended to the case in
which selectivity bias is due to two sources rather than one. The appropriate selec-
tion correction depends on whether the error terms for the two selection equations
are independent. Thus we have run, for each year, a “preliminary” cross-sectional
bivariate probit to test if Cov
¡
vit1 , vit2
¢
= 0. The bivariate probit indicated that
the hypothesis Cov
¡
vit1 , vit2
¢
= 0 could not be rejected. Thus, we have estimated
the selection equations and constructed the estimate of the selection correction
terms using two separated standard probit model estimates for each year in order
to calculate the correction terms (IMRs). The selectivity terms included as a re-
gressor in the equation of interest (estimated using pooled ordinary least squares
regression) are simple extensions of those proposed by Wooldridge (1995).
Since not many studies exist that use this method in practise, we have applied
the proposed model. The application concerns an important problem in health
economics: the presence of asymmetric information in the private health insurance
markets. We have tested whether there exists a positive correlation between the
amount of insurance an individual buys and his ex-post risk experience. As indi-
cator of generosity and completeness of health plan, we have employed the natural
logarithm of health insurance reimbursement (i.e. of health care expenditure paid
by private insurance) as a share of total health expenditures. Our findings support
the hypothesis of a systematic relation between illness of individuals and insurance
choice.
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4. APPENDIX
Table 1: Variables Name and Definition
 Variables Name Variables Definition
age age in years
male 1 if male, 0 otherwise
white 1 if white, 0 otherwise
black 1 if black, 0 otherwise
other_race 1 if other race, 0 otherwise
northeast 1 if lives in Northeast region, 0 otherwise
midweast 1 if lives in Midweast region, 0 otherwise
west 1 if lives in  West region, 0 otherwise
south 1 if lives in  South region, 0 otherwise
msa 1 if lives in Metropolitan Statistical Area, 0 otherwise
income total annual income
union 1 if union status, 0 otherwise
employed 1 if employed, 0 otherwise
education 1 if had high_school, master or PhD degree , 0 otherwise
expenditure total annual health care expenditure
lnreimbursement natural logarithm of reimbursement paid by insurance
share_reimbursement natural logarithm of reimbursement paid by insurance as share 
of total annual health care expenditure
lnexp_paid_other_sources natural logarithm of expenditure paid by other sources
family size family size
high_risk 1 if current health is poor or fair, 0 otherwise
activity limitations 1 if has limited in any activities because health
 problems, 0 otherwise
need care 1 if needs for care during the year of interview, 0 otherwise
need specialist 1 if needs for specialist during the year of interview, 0 otherwise
insured 1 if insured, 0 otherwise
insurance_preference 1 if agree with "Health insurance is not worth the money it 
costs", 0 otherwise
insurance_attitude 1 if is likely to take risk, 0 otherwise
dental_bills 1 if plan covers dental bills, 0 otherwise
drug_costs 1 if plan covers drug costs, 0 otherwise
group_insurance 1 if gets  insurance through their employers or organizations, 
lncopayment natural logarithm of copayment
mills1 mills ratio insurance partecipation
mills2 mills ratiohealth care expenditure partecipation
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
 All Ins ure d Unins ure d
A ge 44 44.04    43.61
Male 0.3306 0.3333  0.2973
Income  42519.25 44452.26  18539.39 
Total health care expenditure 35000.09 3592.092 2357.689
Copayment  879.3203
Group Insurance  0.9223
A nnual premium 1821.522
N ortheast 0.1532 0.1634 0.0270
South 0.3679 0.2897 0.5676
W est 0.1966 0.3518 0.2162
Midwest 0.2823 0.1949 0.1892 
W hite 0.8568 0.8758 0.6216
Black 0.0968 0.0806 0.2973
O ther Race 0.0464 0.0436 0.0810
Metropolitan statistical area 0.8145  0.83 0.6216
H igh Risk Individuals 0.0776 0.0708 0.1622  
A ctivity limitations 0.2520 0.2462 0.3243
Low Insurance Attitude 0.2218 0.2233 0.2027
Low Insurance P references 0.2429 0.2321 0.3783
N umbe r of obs e rvations 992 918 74
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Table 3: Preliminary BivariateProbit Correlation Coeﬃcients
(p-value in parentheses)
                 Dependent Variables        pho  p-value
Positive Expenditure/ Be Insured 2003  -0.1340   0.893     
Positive Expenditure/ Be Insured 2004  -0.3727 0.446            
Note: sample size 496.
Table 4: Cross-Sectional Bivariate Probit Estimation Coeﬃcients
(p-value in parentheses)
  Expenditure 2003 Be Insured 2003
intercept 0.5013  (0.659) -1.6287 (0.032)
age 0.0264  (0.075)  0.0076(0.378) 
male -1.1982(0.000)  0.0939(0.699) 
black -0.3491(0.449) -0.9542(0.000) 
other_race -0.2243(0.754)  -0.5702(0.204)
family size -0.1871(0.109) 0.2500(0.012)
msa -0.0803(0.849) 0.6041(0.007) 
northeast 0.0537(0.893) 0.7778(0.113)
midwest 0.5476(0.224) 0.0891(0.741)
west 1.1711(0.082) -0.0963(0.721)
insured 1.2838(0.485)
income 4.0600(0.453) 0.0001(0.008)
union 0.3602(0.486)
employed 0.4195(0.149)  
education 0.0765(0.908) 0.7719(0.009) 
need care -0.2017(0.560) 
need specialist 0.8533(0.160)
insurance attitude -0.4376(0.068)
Note: sample size 496.
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Table 5: Cross-Sectional Bivariate Probit Estimation Coeﬃcients
(p-value in parentheses)
  Expenditure 2004 Be Insured 2004
intercept
age  0.0112(0.441) 0.0133(0.137) 
male -1.4139(0.000) -0.0372(0.880) 
black -0.3407(0.472) -0.9401(0.001)
other_race 0.5758(0.448) -0.6887(0.129) 
family size -0.2696(0.012) 0.2954(0.002)
msa -0.0089(0.981) 0.6012(0.014) 
northeast -0.4157(0.406) 0.9329(0.061)
midwest -0.3945(0.367) 0.1165(0.664) 
west -0.5889(0.177) -0.0947(0.733)
insured  1.0708(0.256)
income  4.9400(0.306) 0.0002(0.000) 
union  0.3671(0.449)
employed  0.3262(0.270)
education 0.1199(0.827) 0.6830(0.030)
need care 0.8899(0.010)
need specialist -1.1089(0.061)
insurance attitude -0.2287(0.410)
Note: sample size 496
Table 6: Pooled OLS Regression Results.
Risk Variable: Self-Assessed Health.
 Preidictor Variab les Coef f ic ien ts p-va lues
intercept 0.5309 0.000   
age  0.0007 0.167
male -0.0029  0.830 
msa -0.0245 0.094
northeast 0.0044 0.781 
midwest 0.0264 0.042 
west -0.0102 0.488 
black -0.0016 0.944
other race -0.0285 0.248 
education -0.0265 0.274 
income  -4.64e-07    0.008
group_insurance   0.07812    0.000
lnpremium  -8.42e-07  0.689 
lncopayment -0.0384  0.000
lnexp_paid_other_sources -0.0160 0.003
dental_bills  0.0439   0.000
drug_ costs 0.0917  0.000
high_risk 0.0776 0.000
activity limitations 0.0406  0.001 
insurance preferences -0 .0462 0.000
mills1 -0.1566  0.034 
mills2 -0.0899  0.079 
Note: sample size 895; R2 = 0.2505; Adjusted R2 =0.2325
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